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The  music  and  movie  industries  have  recently  added 
individual consumers as the target of the file sharing lawsuits. 
It  is  often  questioned  why  the  industries  use  substantial 
resources to fight in the courtrooms instead of making better 
and more affordable products. In this article, we first analyze 
the reasons of the industry behavior suggesting that the court 
strategy may be in fact more effective, at least in the short term, 
than  it  should  be  based  on  pure  economic  calculations. 
However, the empirical evidence seems to imply that lawsuits 
fail to send a strong signal to individuals about the society’s 
supposedly  negative  attitude  towards  file  sharing.  General 
deterrence from the threat of being sued does not help in the 
end either because people are risk seeking in the face of making 
a decision between a certain and probable loss. In conclusion, 
we argue that the court strategy cannot be used to establish any 
social norm with a long lasting effect on individual behavior as 
long as the peer pressure works towards the opposite direction. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
The Internet seems to have upset the music and movie industries. The level of 
unauthorised  copying  of  music  and  movies  has  been  staggering  since  the 
invention of the present-day peer-to-peer file sharing systems. Amid all the public 
debate, however, the industries continue to prosper. For example 2003 was very 
successful for the music industry in many countries including the New Zealand, 
UK, Finland and the Netherlands.
1 Also the movie industry has been continuously 
breaking sales records during the last few years with rapidly increasing DVD 
sales and rentals.
2 Nevertheless, there is evidence that file sharing on the Internet 
has  indeed  caused  real  economic  losses  to  especially  the  music  industry  (e.g. 
Liebowiz, 2004 and Peitz and Waelbroeck, 2004).  
 
We start this paper by noting that the discussion about copyright violations and 
solutions on the Internet is definitely not a novel phenomenon. The controversy 
between copyright users and copyright industries has existed practically as long as 
the Internet has existed. Only the scale has changed. We also analyze the first 
major  “copyfight”,  in  which  Scientology  and  net-activists  waged  a  war  about 
Scientology’s secret scriptures.   
 
Then we dig into the question why the music and movie industries have started to 
wage lawsuits against individual consumers instead of making better and more 
affordable  products.  We  first  analyze  reasons  for  this  behaviour  and  form  a 
traditional  and  a  behavioural  economic  model  on  the  deterrence  effect.  It  is 
suggested that the court strategy may be in fact more effective than it should be 
based on economic calculations in the short run. However, our argument is that 
the  lawsuits  will  fail  in  forming  a  social  norm  against  file  sharing.  We  also 
                                                 
1 Worldwide CD sales statistics can be found from http://www.ifpi.org 
2 At least in the US, DVDs present today well over 2/3 of the movie industry’s annual sales and 
the share of DVD is still growing. See e.g. The Economist, 2003. discuss shortly various counter-measures the consumers have taken to minimize 
the risk of getting sued.  
 
In the last part of the article the anthropological material is combined with the 
tools used in behavioural law and economics to produce more realistic models and 
analysis of individual behaviour. We use data from two cases i.e. from RIAA’s 
action in the U.S. and a Finnish Finreactor case to verify the conclusions. 
 
The  method  used  in  this  paper  can  be  perhaps  described  as  microeconomic 
anthropology.  We  refer  to  postings  from  Usenet  and  popular  web  sites  like 
Slashdot in order to form more realistic assumptions on how individuals behave.
3 
This methodology is common in social science because it avoids certain pitfalls 
often found in surveys such as the tendency to try to answer “right”. We readily 
acknowledge that there are limits in this approach but we still firmly believe that 
it can answer reliably to questions like “does this really happen” or “does people 
think this way” in limited circumstances.  
 
2.  The Origins of Copyright Discussion on the Internet 
2.1 Early Postings 
 
First public discussions about copyright violations on the Internet date back to the 
very early days of network. In the Usenet, the first of such entries can be traced 
back to 1982.
4 The discussions retrieved from the Usenet are surprisingly similar 
compared to the ones we have today. Only the scale back then was different – for 
example the term “copyright violation” was used only 59 times between May 
1981 and May 1986.
5   
 
A striking example is a post made by Tim Maroney to the net.general newsgroup: 
 
Newsgroups: net.general 
From: unc!tim 
Subject: Massive copyright violations on the net 
Posted: Mon Dec  6 09:25:41 1982 
 
It  is  very  common  for  people  who  find  some  piece  of  prose 
pleasing  to  post  it  to  the  net.  Most  commonly,  these  are 
                                                 
3 For a discussion on methodology see Rehn, 2001. 
4 Most likely there has been even earlier public discussions in different bulleting boards predating 
the birth of Usenet. 
5 Google’s Usernet Archive starts from May 12
th, 1981 reviews  of  books,  but  I  have  seen  entire  essays  and  such 
posted.  Although  the  motivations  of  the  people  who  do  this 
are admirable, it is past time for someone to point out the 
following: 
 
This  is  a  crime.  It  is  a  crime  to  publish  or  in  any  way 
reproduce for public consumption such copyrighted materials 
without  explicit  permission.  It  is  also  a  crime  to 
rebroadcast  knowingly  such  materials.  All  sites  which 
broadcast these are guilty. 
 
This may seem like a minor crime, since no one is making any 
money from it. This is a false impression. Place yourself in 
the position of the writer who lives from day to day on the 
earnings of his or her writing. These people are not, like 
most net contributors, people who play around with writing, 
people who have a neat idea and casually decide to share it 
with  people,  but  professional  craftsmen.  To  infringe  on 
their copyrights this way is to steal from them. If you have 
sufficient respect for the writer that you wish to share his 
or  her  work,  then  have  enough  respect  not  to  steal  from 
them. Many writers would probably not object to the posting 
if  you  asked,  but  please  do  ask.  Write  in  care  of  the 
publisher, or get a phone number from the publisher (or the 
phone  book).  Show  some  consideration;  suppose  someone  were 
to  take  a  piece  of  your  commercially  distributed  software 
and post it. Thank you for reading this. 
 
           Tim Maroney 
           unc!tim 
 
Tim’s post generated 14 replies to net.followup. Most of them asked for more 
information or agreed with his position. Mark didn’t:  
 
Newsgroups: net.followup 
From: cbosgd!mark 
Subject: Re: Massive copyright violations on the net 
Posted: Fri Dec 10 13:11:07 1982 
 
 
Look,  you're  getting  it  wrong.    It  may  be  a  copyright 
violation to post copyrighted things on USENET, but there is 
no way you can sue the net (or an individual site) or bring 
down the net.  That's like making the CB radio band illegal 
because  somebody  uses  profanity  on  the  air.  It's  like 
arresting  your  mailman  because  he  delivered  a  letter  whose 
contents are a threat to the life of the president. 
 
The network as a whole is not responsible for assuring that 
the  things  posted  to  it  are  free  and  clear.  Neither  is  a 
particular site. The person responsible (that's PERSON, you can't throw a machine in jail) is the one who posted it in 
the first place.  S/he knew (or should have known) that by 
posting it, they are making 400 copies and distributing them 
to  10000  people.    We  should  make  people  aware  that  they 
should not post copyrighted material without permission, but 
the network as a whole is not threatened. 
 
 Mark 
 
Basically the main elements of any modern copyright controversy are summarized 
in  that  thread.  Tim’s  arguments  and  rhetoric  is  quite  similar  to  the  one  the 
copyright  industries  are  advancing  today.  Mark  made  the  same  case  Napster, 
KaZaA, Grokster, et. al. have repeated later. Only minor details such as references 
to the fair use doctrine and other user rights were missing. In fact, user right 
comments did not really exist in other forums either. Individuals seem to have 
simply ignored the question: for example the landmark outcome from the Sony-
Betamax case was only celebrated in two short messages. 
 
In  general,  copyright  discussions  remained  relatively  calm  during  most  of  the 
1980s and early 1990s. The only major copyright disputes were about software. 
Already  at  that  time  some  used  the  Internet  as  a  distribution  channel  to 
unauthorized copies of different commercial software, which created anger among 
the first Internet activists. (Appendix I) 
 
2.2 Early File Sharing Practises 
 
The distribution of infringing files on the Internet was mainly done via dedicated 
file servers. Usenet did not have yet that active role in illegal distribution because 
binary file attachments were frowned upon. This made the surveillance of the 
Internet relatively easy for organizations like Software Publishers’ Association 
(SPA)  and  Business  Software  Alliance  (BSA),  because  the  targets  were 
centralized. (Fryer, 1995) Similarly, the limited user base made the identification 
of copyright violators easier.  
 
During the 1980s all through the early 1990s, the most popular file distribution 
method outside the Internet was Bulletin Board Systems (BBS). In this model, 
there was always one central computer where users connected via modems and 
uploaded files for others to download. Peer-to-peer distribution was also used, but 
the carrier was the old fashioned postal system. Also so-called copy-parties were 
common. In these events individuals got together (typically at some unsuspicious school e.g. under the pretence of “programming contest”) to share their copied 
software.
 6 
 
Of course, the software industry reacted to this threat. Their response was multi-
pronged. At the beginning the software industry relied more on educating the 
users and used different copy protection schemes. This strategy was soon found to 
be ineffective and even counterproductive because copy protections annoyed only 
those users who were using legal copies. Next, the software industry started to go 
after infringing (corporate) users and also attacked the sources of illegally copied 
software with the help of authorities.  
 
For example, in Finland there were some very high profile court cases against 
BBS-operators  during  the  early  nineties.  These  cases  ended  up  to  the  highest 
instance,  which  awarded  considerably  high  damages  (basing  the  damage 
calculation on the illusionary claim that one copy equals one lost sale) considering 
that  the  Finnish  jurisdiction  did  not  recognize  punitive  damages.  The  public 
perception of very harsh penalties was born based on the early publicity of the 
cases. The practical effect was that the access to unauthorized copies became 
more limited.  
 
2.3 Case Scientology – Analogy to Current Situation?  
 
The first major copyright-fight on the Internet was staged with this email: 
  
From: miscaviage@flag.sea.org (David Miscaviage) 
Newsgroups: alt.religion.scientology.ctl 
Subject: newgroup alt.religion.scientology 
Date: 17 Jul 91 08:06:31 GMT 
Lines: 0 
 
With that message Scott Goehring created a new group alt.religion.scientology to 
Usenet. Following the Usenet tradition, the post was forged i.e. the sender’s name 
was a misspelled version of the name of the leader of Scientology. (Goehring, 
1995, Lippard and Jacobsen 1995) What followed belongs to the legends of the 
Usenet.  
 
It took awhile for the management of Scientology to find the group but when it 
finally happened, they were ready to do basically anything to stop the threat. The 
problem was that the “secret documents” of Scientology were often posted to the 
newsgroup and that caused a clear and present danger for their business model as 
                                                 
6 Academic discussion about copying was also gearing up but understandably it was not about 
Internet, e.g. Johnson, 1985 and Liebowitz, 1985. the members were paying literally hundreds of thousands of dollars for that very 
same  material.  Also,  the  widespread  knowledge  about  the  key-believes  and 
general conduct of the organization was likely to prevent or at least severally 
harm the recruitment of new members. 
7 
 
Thus, Scientology did not have many other options than to try to prevent the 
dissemination of this information. The task ahead was indeed difficult: the file 
sharing tools available at that time easily transferred the crucial text files. One 
could make the case that Scientology faced in many ways a similar problem to its 
business model as the music and movie industries are facing today.  
 
Their solutions were also surprisingly familiar. Their first move was to attack the 
communication  channel  and  delete  the  newsgroup.  This  however  backfired 
quickly  because  it  drew  attention  to  an  otherwise  rather  obscure  newsgroup 
without  bringing  any  concrete  results.  Next  they  tried  to  cancel  (and  replace) 
messages after they were posted. This approach gave some short term relief but 
the critics counter-reacted and started to re-post. (Lippard and Jacobsen 1995) 
Again, a parallel can be found to the current situation. The music industry has 
tried to “poison” the files on peer-to-peer –networks with non-working ones etc. 
(Christin et al, 2005) 
 
The technical solutions were more or less exhausted at this point and Scientology 
enlisted their lawyers to the fight. They started  to send warning letters to the 
individuals  who  were  posting  possibly  infringing  material.  Again,  there’s  an 
evident  similarity  to  the  music  industry’s  strategy.  (Gruenwedel,  2003)  Since 
threats didn’t bring any results, Scientology decided to launch a full-scale legal 
attack. They chose to target at the same time an end user (ex-scientologist Dennis 
Erlich), his Internet operator (L.A. Valley College Bulletin Board System) and the 
up-stream provider (Netcom). This was the first time when an Internet operator 
was charged based on direct and indirect (vicarious) copyright violation. (Green 
1996) 
 
The outcome of the case was fortunate to the Internet. The judge cleared in RTC v 
Netcom (1995) the Internet operators from liability of the acts committed by their 
customers.  Also,  the  case  against  Dennis  Erlich  was  later  dropped.  This  case 
paved soon way to “safe harbour” legislation, because it made it easier to Internet 
operators to argue in their lobbying material that adding the protection against 
liability would only codify the existing legal regime. As a consequence the music 
and movie industries have not been able to sue the operators. 
                                                 
7 The organization basically believes that human problems are caused by space aliens’ souls.  
Scientology didn’t give up so easily and sued several more individuals and their 
operators.
8 Scientology won or settled out of  court most of these cases. Only 
Karin Spaink got a clear victory in her case in the Netherlands. (Spaink, 2004) 
Still, the outcome of the cases didn’t stop the critical discussions and postings of 
the infringing documents. In effect, the critics became more careful to protect 
their privacy or use the possibilities offered by fair use defences in copyright law. 
The  fight  did  not  end,  but  moved  to  other  areas  like  search  engines,  which 
however go out of the scope of this paper.  
 
To conclude, the infringing files were posted so widely to the Internet, that it 
became impossible to hide them anymore. Also, as a consequence of the legal 
defeat in the Netherlands, the main document about the core beliefs is currently 
legally available. Still, the biggest problem for Scientology may be the negative 
impression they have generated among Internet activists. As a result any news 
about the organization is covered extensively in leading tech-blogs like Slashdot
9 
and it is common to see these online discussions turn into Scientology-bashing. 
 
3.  The Economics of Deterrence and File Sharing 
3.1 Case Music Industry v. File Sharers  
 
The history of file sharing and related court cases follows closely the story of 
Scientology told above. Countless papers have examined the process so far. (e.g. 
Fagin et al 2002 and Netanel, 2003)  
 
In the first phase, the music industry used legal action against Internet service 
providers (e.g. Napster, KaZaa, Grokster). The result was only partial success: file 
sharing  moved  to  distributed  networks  out  of  reach  from  traditional  service 
providers, software companies and middlemen. Now, in the second phase, the 
industry doesn’t have many options left – besides education – than to start court 
cases against individuals.
10  
3.2 A Simple Classical Model 
 
                                                 
8 These cases were all US-based and the plaintiffs were ex-scientologists. 
9 For example: http://slashdot.org/yro/02/03/21/0453200.shtml?tid=99 
10 In this paper, we do not consider the fact that there are many alternative business models, which 
are build on the assumption that users share files freely. See e.g. 
http://www.creativecommons.com/ The classical utilitarian theory of deterrence assumes that individuals – acting as 
rational decision makers – will share files if they do not fear the negative effects 
of (legal) punishment more than they value the benefits of sharing. (e.g. Beccaria 
1764, Becker 1968). The general deterrence theory aims to reduce the success-
rate  of  the  “criminal  enterprise”.  Widely  used  control  mechanisms  include 
copyright education campaigns, indirect legal action targeted on Internet operators 
(secondary liability, take-down procedures etc.), and direct legal actions against 
file sharers themselves.  
 
A  traditional  economic  approach  to  calculate  the  effectiveness  of  the  lawsuits 
against  file  sharers  starts  from  the  expected  utility  of  a  file  sharer.  It  can  be 
calculated by reducing the costs of file sharing (the liability risk (Cl )), other costs 
such as the price of broadband connection (Ce) and the time used to install, learn 
and operate the software (Ct) from the benefit (money saved by downloading e.g 
music (Sm)). An individual uses file sharing software if Sm-(Cl+Ce+Ct ) > 0. Ct and 
Ce may substitute each other i.e. the individual may choose to invest more on 
broadband to lower the cost of Ct. 
 
The liability risk is usually calculated by dividing the number of filed court cases 
by the number file sharers and multiplying that probability by the estimated fine 
i.e.  Cl=(Ncases/Nsharers)*Cfine.  The  problem  with  this  approach  is  that  it  looks 
backwards instead of estimating the risk in the future. The reason is simple, Ncases 
should actually be Nnew cases. 
 
In our very simplified model the plaintiff has a direct control of two variables, the 
number  of  (new)  court  cases  and  the  price  of  the  music  (Ncases  and  Sm).  The 
estimated fine is mostly derived from the legislation but – if publicised as the case 
has  been  –  the  early  out-of-court  settlements  form  the  base  level  for  the 
calculation. 
 
The simplified model does not take into account that Cl is different for different 
individuals.  This  is  actually  the  only  variable  in  the  model,  which  is  under 
individual’ direct control. Individuals can use different methods to lower their 
risks.  
 
First, if a large number of individual file sharers decide not to share any files, then 
Ct  increases  sharply.  This  may  turn  the  utility negative  for  some  file  sharers, 
which means that Nsharers will decrease. Consequently, the likelihood to get sued 
increases and the expected utility drops even further. Such a positive feedback 
loop is one of the few realistic options, which would have a real effect curbing file 
sharing.   
Second, instead of sharing fewer songs, an individual may choose to share only 
those files whose copyright is not aggressively enforced. In order to do this, the 
individual file sharer has to have information which files are more risky. 
 
Third, an individual may try to limit the music industry’s possibilities to monitor  
file sharing. The bad news for music and movie industries is that this approach 
lowers Cl without having significant effect on Ct. The good news is that effective 
global  file  sharing  networks  cannot  identify  the  file  sharers  easily  and  thus 
excluding the industry from “legit” users is a non-trivial task. 
 
The last and potentially the most effective way for file sharers to lower Cl i.e. 
avoid lawsuits is to move to safer file sharing networks. If there are networks, 
which do not reveal the identity of the individual who shares the file, they should 
be preferable. This is true as long as there are no other drawbacks i.e. as long as 
ΔCl > ΔCt. 
 
Lastly, the music and movie industries have been using one additional strategy to 
rise Ct.. They can try to spike the network with inferior quality material forcing 
users to spend more time to find the hoped material or alternatively lower Sm. 
3.3 Classical Model in Action 
 
The classical approach is realistic to a limited extent. It has been verified with 
empirical research by Maffioletti and Ramello, who found that “The provisional 
interpretation of our experimental data suggest that lawsuits can effectively lower 
the rate of copying because of the raise of probability perceived by consumers of 
being caught and thus being punished.” (Maffioletti & Ramello, 2004). 
 
Also our own observations support the theory to the extent that individuals try to 
maximize their welfare by calculating the utility. In fact, most of the discussions 
about  the  Recording  Industry  Association  of  America’s  (RIAA)  court  filings 
included at least one this kind of calculation.
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Re:Overall total? (Score:2) 
by AstroDrabb (534369) * on 23-06-04 5:09 (#9502458) 
 
Those  who  continue  to  do  this  are  probably  going  to 
eventually get caught  
 
                                                 
11 Another, more detailed example can be found from Appendix II  The  RIAA  has  sued  about  3,429  people.  There  are  _atleast_ 
10,000,000 people in the USA alone that are using some type 
of  file  sharing  (and  that  is  not  counting  the  rest  of  the 
world). so (3,429 / 10,000,000 = 0.0003429) * 100 = 0.03429. 
So  you  have  a  .03  percent  chance  of  being  caught  by  the 
RIAA.  I  don't  think  the  RIAA  has  the  "leg  up"  in  this 
situation. 
 
Senior Programmer 
Davenport, FL USA 
 
 
The published figures about average settlements (~3000$) is also often added to 
these calculations. At this point the real life starts to differ from the results of 
Maffioletti and Ramello. The outcome is that an individual is better off practically 
always by participating into file sharing. Also, the calculations lead easily to the 
conclusion that the more the individual downloads, the better off he or she is. 
 
RIAA has been pointing out that it is targeting mostly individuals who share more 
than 1000 songs and thus sharing less lowers the likelihood to be sued:   
 
“On  Monday,  September  8th,  the  RIAA,  on  behalf  of  its 
member  companies,  filed  the  261  copyright  infringement 
lawsuits  against  individuals  who  were  illegally 
distributing,  on  average,  more  than  1,000  music  files  for 
millions  of  other  peer-to-  peer  network  users  to  copy  for 
free.” (RIAA 2003a) 
 
This strategy is of course beneficial to RIAA’s goals because it rises Ct due to 
lower number of available sources. Targeting major sharers makes the cases also 
appear less aggressive. However, not everyone agrees with the RIAA’s strategy: 
 
Zigging when they should zag (Score:3, Insightful) 
by Anonymous Coward on 25-06-03 21:40 (#6295717) 
 
Well, these clowns have been fighting the wrong battles here 
for ages. This one is no surprise. 
 
The  strength  of  P2P  has  nothing  to  do with  the  small  %  of 
users  who  share  huge  amounts  of  material.  It's  the 
combination of thousands of individuals each sharing a small 
amount  of  material.  Seeing  tactics  like  this  is  even 
counterproductive because it sends the message that sharing 
a  few  files  is  okay;  the  real  crime  is  sharing  lots  of 
files. 
 Even  with  its  size,  the  RIAA  isn't  big  enough  to  sue  the 
litte guys who are the engine of P2P. This human-redundancy 
is why P2P is around to stay. 
 
Also, the individual’s risk minimization i.e. lowering the probability of getting 
sued is not only theoretical practice but it was (and is) extensively used. This 
approach was especially popular in the beginning of the lawsuits because the early 
subpoenas contained the names of the infringing files and from that information it 
was obvious that some artists were monitored more closely than others. 
12  
 
The simplest form of self-defense is turning off the “show all shared files” option 
from the file sharing software. The more advanced option is to use specific lists of 
blocked  addresses.  Some  file  sharing  software  has  this  ability  build-in  (e.g. 
Emule) but it is also possible to use specific program for this purpose like Peer 
Guardian
13, which acts like a firewall and prevents all connections from blocked 
addresses. In addition, some firewalls support blacklisting.
14 
 
The  good  news  with  this  approach  is  that  RIAA  (and  companies  which  sell 
monitoring services) can very easily check whether their IP-addresses are blocked 
or not and in latter case just to change to a new IP-address(range). The blacklists 
have  to  be  publicly  available  to  be  useful  for  normal  users  and  therefore  the 
content industry has unavoidably the upper hand in this part of the technology 
race. 
 
In  the  beginning  the  self-defense  approach  was  used  mostly  in  KaZaA  and 
different Edonkey-clients and Bit-Torrent. (PEW and comScore, 2004) None of 
these two programs offer any advanced privacy protections and thus the benefit 
came from the fact that RIAA was most worried about the biggest network. After 
the  usage  of  Edonkey  and  Bit-torrent  increased,  the  networks  started  to  draw 
attention  and  thus  the  early  benefits  were  lost.  The  next  step  will  be  more 
anonymous networks like Freenet and Mute. The problem with these networks is 
that  they  are  very  hard  and  slow  to  use  and  hence  Ct  is  very  high.  Alienw’s 
experiences demonstrate this: 
 
Re:Protect your privacy (Score:2) 
by alienw (585907) on 29-04-04 6:00 (#9003908) 
MUTE is a piece of shit made by a complete idiot. Have you 
even  tried  using  it?  My  top  speed  on  it  was  500  BYTES  per 
second.  The  retard  who  programmed  it  used  a  text-based 
protocol  that  wastes  an  incredible  amount  of  usable 
                                                 
12 EFF made a tool for this: http://www.eff.org/IP/P2P/riaasubpoenas/ 
13 http://www.methlabs.org/methlabs.htm 
14 More info: http://methlabs.org/forums/forumdisplay.php?f=6  bandwidth  (and  there  isn't  that  much  to  begin  with  because 
the  protocol  is  inefficient).  In  short:  good  idea, 
incredibly bad implementation. 
 
If  you  think  this  post  needs  to  be  modded  down,  try  using 
the reply button instead.
15 
4.  Behavioral Aspects 
4.1 The Limits of the Classical Model: A Corrected Model 
 
The classical model seems to imply that in the end the music and film industry is 
fighting a futile fight with its lawsuits. Situation looks even worse after behavioral 
aspects  are  taking  into  consideration.
16  However,  if  the  music  industry  could 
argue  that  lawsuits  actually  present  the  position  of  the  majority,  the  human 
tendency for conforming to the majority’s perceived position could help the music 
and movie industries to sway individuals away from file sharing. This does not 
seem to be the case. 
 
The classical economic approach relies heavily on the expected utility theory, in 
which  individuals  rationally  choose  between  the  weighted  utilities  of  possible 
outcomes. Cognitional scientists have noted that (in this case) individuals tend to 
favour a substantial probability of larger loss to a certain limited loss. The finding 
contradicts the classical theory, which assumes that individuals are either risk-
neutral or risk-adverse. (Kahneman and Tversky, 2002) 
 
A straightforward implication to the theory of deterrence is that even if the music 
and movie industries could reach a situation, in which Cl ≈Sm, the users would still 
favour sharing instead of buying the music or movies.  
 
The calculation itself needs also few refinements. To get more realistic results, the 
following parameters should be also taken into consideration: 
 
-  The reputational cost of violation 
-  The reputational benefit of violation (Sunnstein, 2003) 
 
                                                 
15 http://yro.slashdot.org/comments.pl?sid=105737&cid=9001566 
16 Though, behavioralism is not universally endorsed. For example Gregory Mitchell criticizes its 
premises in his article “Taking Behavioralism Too Seriously? The Unwarranted Pessimism Of 
The New Behavioral Analysis Of Law” (2002). 
 With reputational cost we mean unofficial sanctions, which are applied by the 
individual’s peers. These can be e.g. different forms of taunting or scolding or 
ostracizing the individual file sharer. On the other hand, the reputational benefits 
may arise if the subcommunity, into which the individual belongs, is supportive 
towards his actions. The benefits may include getting better status in the hierarchy 
of  the  group,  getting  more  friends  or  sexual  partners.  (e.g.  Posner,  2002  and 
Rebellon and Manasse, 2004). These benefits are often hard to quantify but they 
may play a significant role in individual decision-making.  
 
Another slightly different view is that individuals tend to be conformists i.e. they 
prefer  to  follow  the  behaviour  of  others.  A  partial  explanation  is  the  risk  of 
reputational costs. Still, similar “herd behaviour” is also found in circumstances, 
where  the  individual  does  not  have  to  worry  about  the  consequences  of  non-
conformation. If an individual can make a credible case that vast numbers of other 
individuals in the community have stopped doing something, it can actually be 
more  effective  than  emphasizing  the  point  that  the  behaviour  itself  is  illegal, 
morally wrong, or that an infringer may face strong penalties. (Sunnstein) 
 
Finally,  fairness  must  be  taken  into  account.  Empirical  evidence  shows  that 
individuals are ready to punish behaviour, which they deem unfair – even at a 
financial  cost  to  themselves.  This  happens  even  if  the  act  of  punishment  is 
anonymous i.e. there are no links to reputational factors. (Sunnstein)  
4.2  Corrected Model in Action 
 
RIAA’s lawsuit campaigns in the USA. In the current environment, individual 
file  sharers  do  not  generally  consider  copyright  violations  on  peer-to-peer 
networks as serious criminal activity. (Pew and ComScore, 2004a). In fact, some 
Internet activists see copyright just as a tool for corporate suppression, and for 
them infringement is more a civic duty than a crime. The following post from 
Slashdot illustrates this position: 
 
Wow, we're on a roll today! (Score:3, Funny) 
by DroopyStonx (683090) on 29-04-04 1:24 (#9001875) 
 
An  interview  with  fuckwad  Valenti,  and  now  more  RIAA 
lawsuits! Woweee! 
 
They're sure doing a good job into scaring me... scaring me 
so  much  that  tonight,  I'm  gonna  be  downloading  more  than 
normal! 
 
Got Movies? [newzbin.com] 
Got Music? [newzbin.com]  
I  do  NOW,  and  so  can  you!  Aim  your  middle  fingers  at  them 
and grin, because this is the best weapon against 'em. 
 
That said, we can also identify another group of individuals, who truly believe 
that file sharing is stealing. They don’t seem to dominate the Slashdot-reading 
community,  however.  The  defenders  of  strong  copyright  are  commonly 
moderated down and other posters quite often “flame” them. In other words, they 
face clear reputation costs for their views. 
 
Similarly, among active net users the actions that support file sharing are likely to 
lead reputation benefits. Jesse Jordan’s case offers good anecdotal evidence on 
this. Jordan created a search engine with three of his peers for music files. He was 
sued by RIAA, which demanded $900 million based on the number of files found 
from  their  search  engine.  Jordan  was  soon  forced  settle  his  case  for  $12,000, 
which  he  had  saved  to  pay  his  tuition  at  college.  RIAA  published  the  case 
aggressively and intended to make a warning public example from Jordan. 
 
Instead, RIAA managed to anger active net users. They countered RIAA’s action 
by arranging a fund-raiser, which raised enough money for Jordan to fully cover 
the price of his settlement. His social status got also a significant boost:  
 
“One  sixteen-year-old  girl  from  Alabama  started  sending 
illustrated e-mails, including "a number of fetishes she was 
telling me about," Jordan says.” (Knopper, 2003) 
 
Nevertheless, lawsuit and other actions against individuals who share files may 
still strengthen the standing of strong copyright proponents in the society at large. 
At least RIAA claims that this is the case: 
 
New consumer survey results from a November poll, among 802 
Americans  age  10  and  over,  show  that  64  percent  of  those 
polled  understand  it's  illegal  to  "make  music  from  the 
computer available for others to download for free over the 
Internet."  That's  up  from  37  percent  in  November  2002,  and 
for  certain  subgroups,  the  new  awareness  numbers  are  even 
higher  --  for  example,  69  versus  16  percent  among  "regular 
Internet users. (RIAA, 2003b) 
 
In other words, if RIAA is right the lawsuits seem to signal effectively that file 
sharing is against the copyright law. Another matter is does “against the law” 
translate in the minds of the people to “morally wrong thing to do”. At least 
Maffioletti and Ramello found that even with the lawsuits most consumers (60-
69%) continue to believe that sharing is not unethical.   
PEW and comScore (2003), which results RIAA is referring, is based on phone 
interviews and comScore’s passive monitoring. This may also lead to distortions 
because the tendency of individuals to answer what they except the interviewer 
wants to hear.
17 For example, while Pew and comScore (2004b) conclude in April 
that:  “The number of American Internet users who say they download music or 
share files online has increased slightly, but continues to sag well below peak 
levels”, OECD’s report contradicted the claim by showing that the number of 
users continued to grow as ever. (Figure 1) 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Peer-to-peer users between April 2002 and April 2004. Source: OECD 
(2004) 
 
This  is  basically  bad  news  to  RIAA,  because  it  seems  to  indicate  that  the 
behavioral effect they are hoping to achieve is not working as planned. There is 
an obvious problem with public relations if their message has to fight against 
dissenting views from different parties. For example an independent research firm 
Big Champagne continues to maintain that no real change has occurred. (Garland, 
2004).  
 
Finreactor case in Finland. The most popular peer-to-peer system at the end of 
2004 was BitTorrent. The software is available as open source and there are no 
central indexes or any companies marketing or distributing the software. In effect, 
                                                 
17 Also, the persons who sign up to passive monitoring may not present the users at large. the music and movie industries do not have the option of shutting down the whole 
system by suing any company. They have, however, shut down websites, which 
distribute information (“Torrent links”) on how do download infringing files and 
sued  individual  users.  According  to  the  system  design,  every  user  who  starts 
downloading from the system is also forced to share his files with other users. 
 
One major investigation against a BitTorrent community was started in Finland in 
December  2004.  According  to  a  police  press  release,  around  30  Finnish 
individuals were under investigation for maintaining a website called Finreactor. 
(Afterdawn 2004). Through Fnnreactor, around 10 000 Finnish file sharers were 
exchanging information on how to find infringing files from other users. Every 
individual  who  used  the  information  with  their  BitTorrent  software  both 
downloaded and consequently shared thousands  of infringing music and video 
files with each other.        
 
The impact of the investigation was clearly seen on the traffic of Finnish Internet 
operators.  The  figure  below  describes  the  combined  traffic  information  from 
major Finnish Internet operators. Finreactor was shut down on 14
th December. At 
that day, all Internet traffic dropped sharply and within a week peaked around 
30% lower than before the event.  
  
 
 
Figure 2. Combined traffic of Finnish Internet operators (source Ficix, 
http://stats.lanwan.fi/ficix/) 
 Even though the case was widely published in the Finnish press – including the 
fact that file sharing dropped sharply after the raids – the traffic figures recovered 
around half of the “losses” within a month. The long-term increasing trend seems 
to continue as individuals have subsequently switched to alternative services. The 
figures show only a short-term win for the music and movie industries, which is 
most likely caused by the fact that individuals were not able to find immediate 
replacement.  Two  months  from  the  start  of  the  investigation  and  the  shutting 
down of the Finreactor website the traffic is only at a slightly lower lever than 
before.  
5.  Conclusion 
 
We have now looked into the past and present of file sharing on the Internet. 
From the history it is easy to see that nothing is really new. Only the scale and 
scope  have  changed.  The  Scientology  case  clearly  demonstrated  that  after the 
information has once been digitised and released to the Internet, it is impossible to 
get the “genie back to the bottle”. The more aggressive methods are used to stop 
the distribution, the stronger the resistance becomes.  
 
We noted that the music and movie industries have gained short-term wins with 
their  lawsuit  strategy.  However,  we  can’t  identify  any  substantial  long-term 
impact. The sheer numbers, technological progress, and the economics of scale 
clearly  favour  file  sharers.  Further,  we  argued  that  many  file  shares  are  most 
likely  risk  takers.  Thus,  the  industry  seems  to  be  losing  their  proposition  of 
establishing a stronger social norm against sharing among those who share. The 
industries seem to have taken the facts into consideration in their campaigning 
when they press that it is only a minor group of individuals who share music and 
movie files. What they don’t mention is that this group may never disappear. 
 
Lawsuits however fit into the industry’s multi-pronged offensive strategy against 
file sharing, which has utilized also lobbying and technical protection measures or 
digital rights management (manifested in e.g. CD and DVD copy protections and 
copy protected file formats). The argument seems to go that the industry aims “to 
keep honest users honest” (or “to keep lazy users honest”). At the same time the 
industries admit that it is impossible to end all unauthorised copying and it would 
be futile to believe so.  
 
The ultimate result of the offensive file sharing strategy has been illustrated in the 
somewhat  famous  paper  about  Darknet  –  authored  by  Microsoft  researchers 
supposedly  in  charge  of  the  company’s  trusted  computing  initiative  –  which 
assumes that copyright violators can be separated and the business focus can be put  on  the  well-behaving  consumers.  (Biddle  et  al,  2001)  The  Darknet  paper 
argues as follows:
  
 
There  is  evidence  that  the  darknet  will  continue  to  exist 
and provide low cost, high-quality service to a large group 
of  consumers.  This  means  that  in  many markets,  the  darknet 
will  be  a  competitor  to  legal  commerce.  From  the  point  of 
view of economic theory, this has profound implications for 
business  strategy:  for  example,  increased  security  may  act 
as a disincentive to legal commerce. 
 
In other words, as the industries push their self-protection initiatives, court cases, 
lobbying etc. the Darknet will only get more power. File sharing is in the end the 
biggest competitor to legal services. Thus, in the long term, unless legal services 
can offer clear added value – in the form of better user experience or guaranteed 
legal satefy – a substantial user community will stay inclined to stay on the dark 
side.  
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 Appendix I 
From: brad@looking.UUCP (Brad Templeton) 
Newsgroups: net.followup,net.news,net.legal 
Subject: Copyright Violations - how can software people do this 
Posted: Thu Mar 22 00:00:00 1984 
 
 
I  am  amazed  to  see  people  on  the  net,  most  of  whom  work  in 
software,  actually  defending  copyright  violators.  Don't  you  have 
any interest in your own welfare? 
 
Nobody know how much microcomputer software is stolen by people who 
"just copy it", but I would expect that conservatively one copy is 
stolen for each legitimate copy sold.  Microcomputer software is a 
billion  dollar  industry  (at  least,  probably  more),  so  we  are 
talking about probable billions in theft. Billions that were stolen 
from US. If people paid for the software they steal, I know I would 
be  a great  deal richer and  so would  many  of you. Either salaries 
would  be  higher  or  prices  of  software  would  be  lower  due  to  the 
increased volume. 
 
We must work very hard to combat this attitude. As we enter the so-
called "information age", information will become a very important 
form of property, and thieves will sap our money even more so than 
they do now. It applies to music, too.  How many of you have played 
thief by taping a record just to save $6 to $10? I admit I used to, 
but haven't in many years. 
 
The other day I met a kid (about 17) in a computer store: 
Kid: You have a computer 
Me: Yes, I have several (After all, it's how I make my living) 
Kid: Do you have a Commodore 64? 
Me: Yes, I have one of those 
Kid: Got any games for it? 
Me: I have written some games, yes. 
Kid: Wanna trade? 
Me: For what? 
Kid: I have [some game] 
Me: Did you write that? 
Kid: No, I just got it. 
Me: You mean you stole it? 
Kid:  No,  I  copied  it.  (And  he  really  thought  there  was  a 
difference) 
Me: Is it for sale. 
Kid: No.  Well, in the stores I guess.. 
Me: So you are a thief. 
Kid: Everybody does it... 
Me: and that makes theft OK? 
Kid: Everybody does it. 
 
You've seen this kid yourself, I am sure, for he's everywhere.  One 
little copy doesn't hurt the author, just like one little beer can 
doesn't ruin the park.... 
 
 Appendix II 
The expected "winnings" from Downloading (Score:2, Interesting) 
by CodeBuster (516420) Alter Relationship on 29-04-04 1:37 
(#9002536) 
I thought that it would be interesting if someone from the Slashdot 
community took it upon themselves to compute the net benefit which 
the downloaders accrue given that they have some probability 'P' of 
being selected by the RIAA for a lawsuit which they can settle for 
a  loss  of  $3000.  It  should  be  possible,  in  principle,  to  compute 
for  a  given  probability  'P'  of  being  sued  by  the  RIAA  how  many 
songs  (at  $0.99  per  song  as  per  the  iTunes  rate)  one  should  be 
willing to risk downloading before the total 'winnings' (the money 
saved  by  NOT  paying  for  the  songs)  exactly  balances  the  expected 
losses from being sued by the RIAA. We will make a few assumptions 
in order to simplify our mathematical model... 
 
1.  Let us assume  that  all users on the  file sharing  networks  are 
equally likely to be targeted by an RIAA lawsuit (in reality this 
would  probably  be  a  function  of  the  number  of  songs  shared,  they 
artists and genres of the songs shared, and the amount of bandwidth 
devoted to sharing them out). Let this probability equal 'P'. 
 
2. Suppose that the RIAA can sue no more than 1500 people per year 
(this is probably being generous). 
 
3. Suppose  that  there are approximately  3.5 million  users engaged 
in file sharing on the various networks at any given second (this 
is  probably  a  lower  bound  and  the  actual  number  is  probably  much 
higher).  Now  the  probability  of  being  sued  by  the  RIAA,  assuming 
that all users are equally likely to be sued, is 1000/3.5 million 
or approximately 0.003% chance. 
 
Let the expected losses (per year) from continuing to download be P 
multiplied by 3,000 which is the amount that it will cost to settle 
in  the  event  that  you  are  sued.  Thus  the  expected  losses  to  the 
RIAA for each year that you continue to download are only $8.57 
which means that if you were planning on downloading more than 8.65 
songs per year then your expected savings over paying the $0.99 fee 
per song on a service like iTunes makes it worth your while. 
 
Now  for  a  few  caveats...I  do  not  advocate  the  steeling  of 
intellectual  property  music  or  otherwise  and  the  above  should  be 
treated as a simple (and possibly flawed) look at the mathematics 
of  downloading  stripped  of  any  moral  pretense  or  consequence. 
However, even given the crudity of this analysis it is possible to 
draw a few conclusions... 
 
1.  The  RIAA  lawsuits  will  probably  discourage  the  small  time 
downloaders  and  the  basically  honest  people  from  using  the  file 
sharing networks to get free music, but these users are probably in 
the minority anyway (most people share at about 100 songs). 
 
2. hard core downloaders are not likely to be dissuaded unless the 
probability  of  being  sued  or  the  amount  of  the  damages  or  both 
significantly increase.  
3.  The  RIAA  cannot  sue  everyone  so  there  will  always  be  an 
equilibrium whereby a  user downloads  and shares just enough songs 
not to get noticed so that his expected winnings precisely balance 
his expected losses. 